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Auditors’ Responsibility for Fraud Detection: New Wine in Old Bottles? 
Lawrence Chui 
Byron Pike* 
 
Fraud is costly. According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examinations (ACFE), 
an estimated $3.5 trillion worldwide were lost due to fraudulent financial statements, asset 
misappropriation, and corruption in 2011 (ACFE, 2012). In the U.S. alone, the ACFE projected 
an annual revenue loss of $994 billion due to fraud. These staggering losses represent 
approximately 7% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (ACFE, 2008; ACFE, 2009). Based on 
the U.S. fiscal year 2011 budget, losses resulting from fraud exceeded the net costs of the 
department of defense, homeland security, transportation, and education combined for fiscal year 
2008. Fraud is not only costly, but it also damages the reputation and the credibility of the audit 
profession. The loss of public trust seems justified when audited financial statements turn out to 
be unreliable and must be restated due to fraud. As a result, the investing public is elevating its 
expectations for auditors to detect fraud (Eillot and Jacobson, 1987; Hooks, 1991; Nicolaisen, D. 
T., 2005; Silverstone and Davia, 2005; Hogan et al., 2008). 
Accounting researchers, practitioners, and standard setters alike expressed concern for 
auditors’ apparent failures in detecting fraud during an audit. Joseph T. Wells, founder of the 
ACFE, criticized auditors for their lack of training and readiness in fraud detection. He contends 
that “[a]s a group, CPAs are neither stupid nor crooked. But the majority are still ignorant about 
fraud…for the last 80 years, untrained accounting graduates have been drafted to wage war 
against sophisticated liars and thieves” (Wells, 2005b). Jamal (2008) agrees with Wells’  
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sentiment by arguing fraud detection has become the audit profession’s Achilles heel. Even 
convicted felons agree that auditors lack the ability to detect fraud. For instance, Sam Antar, 
from the infamous Crazy Eddie case, made some insidious remarks on his website 
(http://www.whitecollarfraud.com) about how easily he was able to deceive the auditors.  He 
remarked that as a general practice, “most large accounting firms use relatively inexperienced 
kids right out of college to do basic audit leg work. They are supervised by slightly more 
experienced senior auditors who unfortunately depend on feedback from these inexperienced 
kids in making informed decision.”  Antar further explained how he was able to corrode the 
auditors’ professional skepticism as the auditors “did not want to believe we were crooks. They 
believed whatever we told them without verifying the truth.”  
In an effort to restore public trust in the audit profession, accounting standard setters have 
increased the steps auditors are expected to take in order to detect fraud. As a result of the Enron 
and WorldCom debacles, auditors are currently required to adhere to the requirements of 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99. Under the guidance of this standard, auditors are 
required to participate in brainstorming sessions and consider the possibility that a material 
misstatement due to fraud could be present (AICPA, 2002). Standard setters expected SAS No. 
99 to increase auditors’ awareness of the prevalence of fraud during their audit engagements. 
Despite the standard setters’ intentions to improve auditors’ abilities to detect fraud, the Public 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection team observed numerous instances where 
auditors failed to appropriately implement SAS No. 99 (PCAOB, 2007). In addition to SAS No. 
99, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) released a series of audit 
risk standards (SAS Nos. 104 – 111) to help provide auditors guidance in regard to the risk 
assessment process. Similarly, the PCAOB in August 2010 adopted a suite of eight auditing 
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standards (AS Nos. 8 – 15) to enhance the effectiveness of auditors’ risk assessments. Daniel L. 
Goelzer, PCAOB Acting Chairman, stated these standards are designed to promote sophisticated 
risk assessments in audits and to minimize the risk that auditors fail to detect material 
misstatements (PCAOB, 2010).    
Though the PCAOB inspection report proves to be disappointing, its findings are not all 
that surprising. For years, the ACFE reported only a small percentage of fraud cases were 
uncovered by external audit. Hence, external audit may not be the most effective way to detect or 
limit fraud (ACFE 2012; ACFE, 2010; ACFE, 2008; ACFE, 2006; ACFE, 2004; ACFE, 2002). 
Financial statement auditors are not fraud examiners. They are trained to determine whether the 
company’s financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Fraud detection, unlike a financial 
statement audit, requires a unique skill set and forensic techniques developed for the sole 
purpose of detecting the evidence of fraud (Davia, 2000). Specifically, the skill set and 
techniques include applying investigative and analytical skills related to the areas of accounting 
records, gathering and evaluating financial statement evidence, interviewing all parties related to 
an alleged fraud situation, and serving as an expert witness in a fraud case (Hopwood et al., 
2008; Rosen, 2006; Singleton et al., 2006). Therefore, merely requiring auditors to be aware of 
the possibility of fraud in a financial statement audit is not enough to detect fraud.   
We observe a trend that standard setters often resort to issuing additional auditing 
standards as a response to restore public trust after widely publicized frauds. However, time and 
again, auditors appear to fail in fraud detection as the response of additional standards is 
primarily symbolic in nature. We contend the failure in fraud detection is attributable to the 
differences in skill sets and task objectives between financial statement auditing and fraud 
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auditing. Although standard setters have gradually realized the need to involve forensic 
specialists in a financial statement audit after a fraud risk factor has been identified, auditors 
have not made much progress in fraud detection.  
We propose it is necessary to integrate forensic specialists into all audit engagements to 
reduce the risk of fraud. In addition, we believe it is of paramount importance to train financial 
statement auditors in the area of forensic accounting and fraud auditing. Without proper and 
adequate forensic training, expecting financial statement auditors to detect fraud is similar to 
pouring new wine into old bottles. In order to better protect the public from fraud and to maintain 
the credibility of the audit profession, it is necessary for accounting researchers to explore new 
ways of improving auditors’ abilities to detect and limit fraud. 
Our contribution to the literature consists of providing a synopsis of auditors’ 
responsibility for fraud detection and the standard setting progression. More importantly, we 
provide a critical assessment of the profession’s reaction to fraud and identify the deficiencies in 
auditors’ approaches for detecting fraud that still exists today. Through doing so, we utilize an 
expert panel to demonstrate the demarcation between auditors and forensic specialists. Finally, 
we make the contribution of proposing an audit model that could potentially overcome the 
identified deficiencies. 
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the changes in auditors’ responsibility 
for fraud detection over the years. We then highlight the differences between financial statement 
auditors and forensic specialists. Finally, we conclude by identifying future actions and research 
opportunities that can be used to improve auditors’ abilities to detect fraud. 
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AUDITORS’ RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETECTING FRAUD 
Shift in Audit Focus on Fraud Detection 
Auditors’ responsibility for fraud detection has changed dramatically over the years. 
Fraud detection was once the chief audit objective dating back to 1500 and beyond (Brown, 
1962; Albrecht et al., 2001). Early British auditing objectives, which centered on the discovery 
of defalcations, formed the basis of American auditing during its formative years when auditors 
were taught that the primary objectives of an audit were to detect and prevent fraud and error 
(Dicksee, 1909; Montgomery, 1921; Brown, 1962). The ability of auditors to detect fraud was 
considered a virtue of the profession:   
“The detection of fraud is a most important portion of the auditor’s duties, and there     
will be no disputing the contention that the auditor who is able to detect fraud is – other 
things being equal – a better man than the auditor who cannot. Auditors should, therefore, 
assiduously cultivate this branch of their functions – doubtless the opportunity will not 
for long be wanting – as it is undoubtedly a branch that their clients will most generally 
appreciate.” (Dicksee, 1909, p. 23)   
 
 
The emphasis on fraud detection gradually dissipated during the period from 1933 to 
1940 (Brown, 1962; Albrecht et al., 2001). Long before the Enron debacle, the audit profession 
was confronted with the infamous McKesson and Robbins scandal in late 1938.
1
 The McKesson 
and Robbins scandal was “like a torrent of cold water” that “shocked the accountancy profession 
into breathlessness” (Carey, 1939, p. 65). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
opened an investigation into McKesson and Robbins shortly after the massive fraud was 
uncovered. McKesson and Robbins’ auditor, Price Waterhouse & Co, was under intense scrutiny 
for its inability to detect and prevent the massive accounting fraud. In the aftermath of the 
McKesson and Robbins scandal, auditors were required to perform additional audit procedures 
                                                 
1
 McKesson and Robbins was a wholesale drug company acquired by F. Donald Coster in 1926. Coster and his 
brothers ran an elaborate accounting scheme to inflate the company’s reported assets for more than a decade. By 
1937, this translated into over $18 million of fictitious sales and $19 million worth of non-existent assets. 
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on accounts receivable and inventories (Baxter, 1999). To limit potential liability exposure for 
auditors, the audit profession came to the consensus that “auditor(s) could not, and should not, be 
primarily concerned with the detection of fraud” (Brown, 1962, p. 700).  
The change in the audit profession’s focus on fraud detection was reflected in the 
Statement of Auditing Procedures (SAP) No. 1, Extension of Auditing Procedure:  
“The ordinary examination incident to the issuance of financial statements 
accompanied by a report and opinion of an independent certified public accountant is 
not designed to discover all defalcations, because that is not its primary objective, 
although discovery of defalcation frequently results…To exhaust the possibility of 
exposure of all cases of dishonesty or fraud, the independent auditor would have to 
examine in detail all transactions. This would entail a prohibitive cost to the great 
majority of business enterprises – a cost which would pass all bounds of reasonable 
expectation of benefit or safeguard there from, and place an undue burden on 
industry.” (AICPA, 1939) 
 
SAP No. 1 effectively shifted auditors’ foci away from fraud detection during an audit. Auditors 
were instead concerned with determining the fairness of their clients’ reported financial 
statements in accordance with the accounting standards (Brown, 1962). Subsequent to the 
issuance of SAP No. 1, the audit profession came under mounting pressure from the public and 
the SEC to clarify auditors’ responsibility with respect to fraud detection (Brown, 1962; Albrecht 
et al., 2001). As a result, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued 
SAP No. 30, Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor in the Examination of 
Financial Statements in 1960. Although SAP No. 30 acknowledged that auditors should be 
aware of the possibility fraud may exist during an audit, it was so negatively stated that auditors 
felt little or no obligation to detect fraud (Scott and Frye, 1997; Albrecht and Willingham, 1993). 
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The Cohen and the Treadway Commissions 
The Equity Funding scandal was the next major fraud case that ultimately prompted 
congressional inquiry about auditors’ failures in fraud detection (Treadway, 1987).2 In response 
to the Congressional inquiry, the AICPA formed the commission on auditor’s responsibility, 
commonly known as the Cohen Commission, to re-examine auditors’ responsibility to detect 
fraud (Treadway, 1987; Albrecht and Willingham, 1993; Scott and Frye, 1997).
3
 The 
Commission acknowledged that while auditors should be actively considering the potential for 
fraud, the inherent limitation in the audit process dampened auditors’ responsibility for detecting 
all material frauds. Specifically, the commission recognized it is difficult for auditors to detect 
frauds that are concealed and derived from forgery or collusion by members of management. 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 16, The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the 
Detection of Errors or Irregularities, was issued as a result of the Cohen Commission. SAS No. 
16 implicitly acknowledged that auditors have a responsibility to search for frauds that may have 
a material effect on a company’s reported financial statements. It also contained a list of red flags 
auditors should consider when searching for financial statement fraud (Albrecht et al., 2001). 
However, the language of SAS No. 16 was viewed as ambiguous as it did not provide adequate 
guidance for auditors to search for fraud during an audit (Treadway, 1987; Madison and Ross, 
1990). 
Changes in Federal regulations during the 1970s also dampened auditors’ senses of 
obligation to detect fraud. As the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
                                                 
2
 The Equity Funding scandal involved the booking of fictitious receivables and income to inflate earnings per share 
in order to beat earnings expectations. Equity Funding sold insurance to fictitious customers by selling phony 
policies. Although there were sufficient red flags to cause auditors to be more skeptical, they missed the ongoing 
fraud. Equity Funding’s auditors missed 64,000 phony transactions with a face value of $2 billion, $25 million in 
counterfeit bonds, and $100 million in missing assets (Hancox, 1997). 
3
 The commission was led by former SEC chairman, Manuel F. Cohen. 
 
 Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting  
Vol. 5, Issue 1, January - June, 2013 
211 
 
(FTC) pressured professional organizations to “eliminate elements of their codes of professional 
behavior that the government deemed to violate federal anti-trust statues,” the FTC wanted the 
AICPA to allow audit firms to engage in unrestricted advertising (Kinney, 2005, p. 91). Under 
unrelenting pressure, the AICPA lifted its ban on “competitive bidding, the prohibition on 
advertising, and the ban on contingent fees and commissions for nonattest clients” from the 
professional code of conduct (Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen, 2007, p. 3). As a result of the 
removal of the AICPA’s ban on competitive bidding for audit services, the profits margins of 
auditing narrowed significantly among the big audit firms. Stephen A. Zeff claimed he recalled 
hearing a senior practitioner state “the worst thing a Big Eight partner can possibly do these days 
is to lose a client over a matter of principle” (Zeff, 1987, p. 67). The FTC’s mandate to increase 
competition in the audit profession not only fundamentally changed the relationship between 
auditors and their clients, but it also increased cost pressure and subsequently affected audit 
quality in the years to come (Kinney, 2005). Toby Bishop, former president of the ACFE, 
contended competitive bidding placed tremendous pressure on audit firms to limit hours in an 
audit engagement. He argued that such action inadvertently discouraged auditors to look for 
fraud during an audit (as cited in Weil, 2004). 
By the mid-1980s, it was obvious that SAS No. 16 was insufficient and auditors’ 
unwillingness to accept increased responsibility to detect fraud was increasing the expectation 
gap (Albrecht and Willingham, 1993).
4
 The public expects auditors to detect all financial 
statements fraud; however, auditors’ failures in fraud detection continue to widen the expectation 
gap. This widening comes as a result of several publicized business failures, characterized by 
some as audit failures (Scott and Frye, 1997). One in particular, the savings and loan crisis 
                                                 
4
 The expectation gap is the difference between auditors’ performances and public expectations of their 
responsibility.  
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during the mid-1980s, created a new wave of public concern and Congressional inquiry which 
eventually led to the formation of the Treadway Commission (Glover and Aono, 1995). The goal 
of the Treadway Commission was to “identify causal factors that can lead to fraudulent financial 
reporting and steps to reduce its incidence” (Treadway, 1987, p. 1). One of the main purposes of 
the Treadway Commission was to: 
“Examine the role of the independent public accountant in detecting fraud, focusing 
particularly on whether the detection of fraudulent financial reporting has been neglected 
or insufficiently focused on and whether the ability of the independent public accountant 
to detect such fraud can be enhanced, and consider whether changes in auditing standards 
or procedures – internal and external – would reduce the extent of fraudulent financial 
reporting.” (Treadway, 1987, p. 2) 
 
The Treadway Commission further asserted “the ability of the independent public accountant to 
detect fraudulent financial reporting is related directly to the quality of the audit” (Treadway, 
1987, p. 54). Nevertheless, the commission cautioned that although it is important to increase 
auditors’ awareness of financial statements fraud, the investing public ought not to expect that 
fraudulent financial reporting will be completely eradicated (Treadway, 1987).  
Based on the commission’s review of fraudulent financial reporting cases, at least 36 
percent of the cases involved auditors’ failure to recognize, or to pursue with sufficient 
skepticism, certain fraud-related warning signs or red flags that existed at the time the audit was 
conducted. The commission believed if auditors had been more diligent in investigating these red 
flags, the fraudulent activity would have had a greater likelihood of being uncovered (Treadway, 
1987). In 1988, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) issued nine statements of auditing 
standards (SASs) based on the Treadway Commission’s report. These standards (Nos. 53 to 61) 
were designed to clearly outline the external auditor’s role concerning fraud and enhance the 
overall audit procedures for detecting and preventing fraud (Glover and Aono, 1995). Two of 
these pronouncements, SAS No. 53 and No. 54, dealt specifically with congressional concerns 
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about the detection of financial fraud and the potential illegal activities of audit clients (Madison 
and Ross, 1990). Unlike prior standards, auditors were required to apply professional skepticism 
to assume management is neither honest nor dishonest (Albrecht and Willingham, 1993).  
However, in the early 1990s the Public Oversight Board (POB) recognized these new 
SASs had little impact on the way audits were conducted, as they did not help to reduce liability 
lawsuits against auditors. The POB also found that auditors neither consistently complied with 
these standards nor applied the proper degree of professional skepticism required to detect fraud 
(POB, 1993). There was a widespread public belief that while auditors have a responsibility to 
detect fraud, they were neither willing nor capable of doing so. Mounting criticisms on the audit 
profession over its failure to detect fraud prompted the POB to propose a number of 
recommendations to improve auditors’ willingness to detect fraud. The POB asserted auditors 
must accept responsibility for fraud detection. Nevertheless, the POB emphasized “the 
profession cannot, and it cannot be expected to, develop methods that will assure that every 
fraud, no matter how cleverly contrived, will be unearthed in the course of the audit, but it must 
develop means of increasing significantly the likelihood of detecting fraud” (POB, 1993, p. 41). 
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) to 
discourage abusive lawsuits due to fraudulent financial reporting. Among its provisions, the 
PSLRA codified auditors’ existing responsibilities to search for and disclose fraud (Andrews and 
Simonetti, 1996). Nevertheless, researchers argued the PSLRA alone was not sufficient to curb 
financial statements fraud as any litigation reform acts need to work in unison with other 
mechanisms to help detect and prevent fraud (Dyck et al., 2010). 
 
 
 
 Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting  
Vol. 5, Issue 1, January - June, 2013 
214 
 
Increased Fraud Detection Responsibility and SAS No. 99 
The AICPA supported the POB’s recommendations and concluded it was crucial to 
develop an auditing standard focused solely on financial statement fraud (Mancino, 1997). The 
AICPA formed a fraud task force and subsequently issued SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud 
in a Financial Statement Audit, in February 1997. For the first time, fraud was included in the 
title of an auditing standard. SAS No. 82 classified fraud into two distinct categories: intentional 
falsification of financial statements and theft of assets. It provided auditors with a list of risk 
factors covering instances of fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets that 
they should assess during an audit. Under SAS No. 82, auditors must document their assessment 
of fraud risk and their modifications to the audit plan if and when conditions of potential fraud 
appear during the audit. SAS No. 82 was the AICPA's attempt to clarify auditors’ role in fraud 
detection. The intention of the standard was to provide assurance to the public that when external 
auditors signed their names to an opinion finding a company’s financial statements free of 
material misstatements, they have taken extensive steps to ensure they did not overlook any 
underlying fraud (Demery, 1997). Nevertheless, SAS No. 82 did not increase auditors’ 
responsibility to detect fraud beyond the key concepts of materiality and reasonable assurance 
(Mancino, 1997). 
In addition to the issuance of SAS No. 82, the POB appointed a panel to conduct a 
comprehensive review of audit effectiveness at the request of the SEC. In 2000, the panel issued 
its report and recommended auditors perform forensic-type procedures on every audit to enhance 
the likelihood of detecting material financial statement fraud.
5
 The panel further recommended 
audit firms use forensic specialists to provide auditors with fraud-related training (POB, 2000). 
                                                 
5
 According to the panel, these forensic procedures range from conducting surprise inventory or cash counts to 
performing substantive tests directed at the possibility of fraud (POB, 2000). 
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However, none of these efforts appeared to be adopted by firms and did not prevent the waves of 
fraud and earnings restatements that rocked the nation at the turn of the 21
st
 century. Restating 
firms lost over $100 billion in market capitalization between 1997 and 2002 (Coffee, 2003). The 
public was outraged about the fall of Enron, the seventh largest company in the U.S. at the time 
of its demise.  Thousands of Enron employees lost their life’s savings when their pension plans 
were depleted as a result of Enron filing for bankruptcy (Klass, 2004). The audit profession came 
under heavy criticism for failing to carry out its fiduciary duty as gatekeepers who protect the 
public’s interest. In an attempt to restore public confidence, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) and created the Public Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Standard setters 
expected SOX, which is considered the strongest regulation passed since the 1930s, to help 
auditors prevent and limit corporate fraud (Klass, 2004).  
In 2002, SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, was issued 
to replace SAS No. 82 and provide auditors with better guidance on how to enhance their 
abilities to detect fraud during a financial statement audit. The purpose of the standard is to help 
auditors take a proactive approach to prevent and detect fraud by increasing their knowledge of 
their clients, which should result in more meaningful risk assessment procedures (Marczewski 
and Akers, 2005; Kiel, 2008). SAS No. 99 calls for auditors to maintain a questioning mind 
regarding the potential for material misstatements due to fraud throughout the audit. They are 
expected to exercise professional skepticism in gathering and evaluating audit evidence and to 
set aside prior beliefs that management is honest and has integrity. More specifically, it requires 
auditors to engage in brainstorming sessions to discuss the risks of material misstatements due to 
fraud (AICPA, 2002). Additionally, SAS No. 99 recommends audit firms use forensic specialists 
to provide auditors with forensic audit training. While the intent of SAS No. 99 is to improve 
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auditors’ performances related to fraud detection, auditors did not anticipate it would 
substantially affect audit effectiveness (Marczewski and Akers, 2005; Gogin and Johnson, 2008). 
The above discussion demonstrates that auditors’ responsibility for fraud detection has 
changed significantly over time. Table 1 presents a timeline of major scandals and subsequent 
audit changes that impacted the relationship between auditors and fraud detection.  
TABLE 1. Timeline of Major Scandals and Subsequent Audit Changes 
 
Major Scandal – 1930s  The McKesson and Robbins scandal  
 
Subsequent Audit Changes 
– 1930s to 1960s 
 
 The issuance of the Statement of Auditing Procedures (SAP) No. 1, 
Extension of Auditing Procedure  
 The issuance of the Statement of Auditing Procedures (SAP) No. 30, 
Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor in the 
Examination of Financial Statements  
 
Major Scandal – 1970s  The Equity Funding scandal  
 
Subsequent Audit Changes 
– 1970s to 1990s 
 
 The formation of the Cohen Commission to investigate the 
expectation gap and auditors’ responsibility in detecting fraud during 
an audit 
 The issuance of the Cohen Commission’s report 
 The issuance of the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 16, 
The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the Detection of Errors 
or Irregularities 
 The formation of the Treadway Commission to identify causal 
factors that can lead to fraudulent financial reporting and steps to 
reduce its incidence 
 The issuance of the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53, 
The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect Errors and Irregularities 
 The issuance of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act     
 The issuance of the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit 
 The formation of a Public Oversight Board panel to conduct a 
comprehensive review of the effectiveness of the auditing 
 
Major Scandal – 2000s  The Enron scandal 
 
Subsequent Audit Changes 
–  2000s to present 
 
 The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 The formation of the Public Accounting Oversight Board  
 The issuance of the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit 
 AICPA released series of risk suite – SAS No. 104 – 111  
 PCAOB adapted eight risk auditing standards –  AS Nos. 8 – 15 
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Whether or not auditors should be responsible for fraud detection remains both as a 
philosophical and a policy issue that is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between auditors and fraud detection has changed dramatically since the inception of 
the American audit profession. By the late 1930s, the audit profession “refused to accept primary 
responsibility” for detecting fraud in a financial statement audit (Costello, 1991, p. 267). In fact, 
as additional fraud standards were issued, auditors failed to wholeheartedly embrace the 
additional responsibility and procedures to actively search for and detect fraud. It appears 
auditors have maintained the attitude that they should not be responsible for and are not the best 
equipped to provide assurance regarding the presence of fraud. However, as the audit profession 
has been plagued by numerous corporate frauds, it is forced to find ways to improve auditors’ 
considerations of fraud during a financial statements audit. While there are no auditing standards 
that can provide absolute assurance in detecting all fraud, the audit profession has demonstrated 
a commitment to improve auditors’ abilities in fraud detection through the issuance of various 
fraud-related standards over the years. Nevertheless, the question remains whether or not the 
progression of fraud-related auditing standards has better equipped auditors for fraud detection 
and increased their propensity in detecting fraud, which would ultimately provide greater 
assurance to the users of financial statements.    
AUDITORS ARE NOT FRAUD DETECTORS 
Recent research has shown forensic specialists outperform financial statement auditors in 
fraud-related tasks (Rose et al., 2009; Bortiz et al., 2008). Although auditors appear to exhibit a 
lack of sensitivity in discerning the telltale signs of fraud, they are in no way inferior to forensic 
specialists in terms of their education, training, experience, and professionalism. In actuality, 
there are many commonalities between financial statement auditors and forensic specialists. Both 
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are required to maintain a high degree of independence and objectivity; to be innovative; to 
avoid having any preconceptions and biases when evaluating evidence; to have in-depth 
knowledge of GAAP as well as general business practices and processes (Bologna, 1984). 
Although financial statement auditors and forensic specialists share similar characteristics, the 
primary difference that separates them is their mission. Auditors’ primary objective is to examine 
whether the company’s reported financial statements, taken as a whole, are stated fairly in all 
material respects in conformity with GAAP. Their goal is to provide reasonable assurance that 
these statements are free from material misstatements (AU Section 110). Alternatively, forensic 
specialists’ primary objective is to make an absolute determination about the existence and 
source of fraud by gathering and evaluating evidence and interviewing all parties related to an 
alleged fraud situation (Davia, 2000; Silverstone and Davia, 2005; Rosen, 2006; Singleton et al., 
2006; Singleton and Singleton, 2007; Hopwood et al., 2008).    
Gerson et al. (2006) offered a simple analogy to help illustrate the differences between 
these two professions by likening financial statement auditors to patrolmen and forensic 
specialists to detectives. Similar to auditors, patrolmen circulate through their assigned districts 
with the objective of keeping peace in the community. Ideally, patrolmen would like to 
continuously patrol through every location in their districts, however, it would be both time and 
cost prohibitive for them to do so. Thus, to remain effective, patrolmen have to balance risk and 
expectations in order to determine whether to focus or expand their patrols. Unlike patrolmen, 
detectives do not go on patrol. They are tasked to investigate whether a crime has been 
committed. To successfully accomplish their task, detectives would examine everything in the 
alleged crime scene to gather any clues that may help them solve the case. Crime investigation is 
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a time consuming and costly endeavor as detectives are expected to keep searching and piecing 
different clues together until they solve the crime. 
Recall, both the POB and SAS No. 99 encouraged the use of forensic specialists in 
conducting all audits. However, no evidence to date suggests firms have adopted these proposals.  
In 2004, the PCAOB Standing Advisory Group (SAG) recommended a series of fraud-related 
discussion questions as an effort to increase the likelihood of discovering fraud in an audit 
(PCAOB, 2004). Among the questions raised by the SAG was whether forensic specialists 
employ a different mindset than financial statements auditors. We constructed a panel of experts 
with the aim of validating and discerning the differences between auditors and forensic 
specialists as identified in the literature and to ascertain the question posed by the SAG. We 
selected various professionals to serve on our expert panel based on Bologna and Lindquist’s 
(1987) criteria, which includes the experts’ credentials, licensure, and certification, as well as 
writings and publications from his or her field of expertise. Our panel consists of four audit 
experts and five forensic specialists. See table 2 for the credentials and background of our 
experts.   
TABLE 2. Expert panel 
 
Expert Background 
1 Partner from a Big 4 firm with 10 years of forensic experience and is Certified in Financial 
Forensics (CFF) 
2 Forensic services director from a Big 4 firm with 10 years of forensic experience and is a 
Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) 
3 Forensic services manager from a second-tier firm with 4 years of forensic experience and is a 
CFE 
4 Risk advisory manager from a regional firm with 8 years of forensic experience and is a CFE 
5 Professor and director of forensic services in a major university with 10 years of forensic 
experience and is a CFF  
6 Audit partner from a Big 4 firm with 15 years of audit experience and is a CPA 
7 Audit partner from a second-tier firm with 40 years of audit experience and is a CPA 
8 Audit manager from a second-tier firm with 8 years of experience and is a CPA 
9 Audit manager from a second-tier firm with 7 years of experience and is a CPA 
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We conducted our interviews with these experts via conference calls and face-to-face 
conversations. We explained the nature of our research to the experts and we asked them to 
comment on whether the differences between auditors and forensic specialists that we have 
observed from the literature were an adequate representation of their respective professions.  
Specifically, we asked our experts several open-ended questions regarding the role, objective, 
and expectations, as well as the thought process of an auditor and a fraud specialist. We 
summarized the interview comments from our experts in Table 3. Below are selected comments 
that were provided to us by our experts. To avoid applying our own value judgments, we used no 
materiality or weighting standard in our choices of these quotations. 
“…unlike fraud specialists, auditors are only looking for material misstatements in the financial 
statements.” 
 
“Because of the general misconception in the marketplace about the role of financial statement 
auditors in fraud detection, there are certain procedures that auditors will do to specifically 
address fraud risks that go beyond the risk-based approach on material accounts. A typical 
procedure here would be the review of journal entries. However, these are not our primary 
objectives and testing procedures.” 
   
“Fraud specialists generally do not work with a materiality level and given today’s technology 
capabilities it is reasonable for a fraud specialist to examine 100% of a data set of transactions.” 
 
“The requirement to obtain reasonable assurance regarding the detection of material 
misstatements is the same regardless of whether the misstatement results from unintentional error 
or from fraud; hence, financial statement auditors have no specific requirements to find fraud 
although SAS 99 requires us to perform fraud-specific procedures.” 
 
“Financial audits tend to be procedural driven and linear. Fraud audits tend to be about the 
mindset, and tend to be cyclical such as finding evidence, evaluating evidence, revising 
procedures, finding more evidence, evaluating, revising, etc. Financial audits tend to be quite 
similar, especially from year to year or within the same industry. Fraud audits tend be like 
snowflakes, each one takes on its own personality.” 
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TABLE 3. Expert panel interviews summary 
 
Auditor Fraud Specialist 
  
Role and objective as an auditor 
The primary responsibility of an auditor is to gather 
documentation to determine whether the company’s 
reported financial statements taken as a whole 
(including footnotes) are stated fairly, in all material 
respects, in conformity with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
 
 
Expectations for an auditor 
Auditors would be asked to look at their clients’ 
accounts either individually or in aggregate with other 
accounts. They would especially focus on accounts with 
a reasonable possibility of containing a material 
misstatement.  
 
 
Auditors work with a materiality level and they are 
primarily concerned with material matters in an audit. 
Materiality is relevant to them because it serves as a 
guide to their evaluation of audit evidence. 
 
 
Auditors would not be expected to examine every 
transaction and they would generally rely on audit 
sampling. 
 
Auditors would not be concerned with minor 
discrepancies in any single account. They would only 
be concerned if these discrepancies are indicative of 
larger or pervasive problems. 
 
Auditors would generally have a predetermined time 
budget for work. If they spend too much time 
examining one area, they may have to spend less time 
somewhere else or they may run the risk of going over 
budget. While time is of the essence in an audit, 
auditors still have to do a sufficient amount of work and 
should not intentionally reduce or eliminate a 
procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
Role and objective as a fraud specialist  
The primary responsibility of a fraud specialist 
is to determine whether fraud exists, regardless 
of its size or magnitude. The fraud specialist 
also has the responsibility to determine the 
overall extent of fraud (if it exists), how it 
occurred and how the risk of its future 
occurrences can be reduced or prevented. 
 
Expectations for a fraud specialist 
Fraud specialists would be asked to examine 
either a single account or a single transaction 
to see if fraud exists. They may also be asked 
to look at a series of transactions since fraud 
may not necessarily occur in a single 
transaction. 
 
Fraud specialists do not work with a 
materiality level and they are not concerned 
with the concept of materiality. Materiality is 
irrelevant to them because fraud may often 
occur below the materiality level. 
 
Fraud specialists would be expected to 
examine everything in great depth and they 
would generally not rely on audit sampling. 
 
Fraud specialists would be concerned with any 
minor discrepancies. They would assess these 
discrepancies to understand their nature and to 
determine if they are indicative of fraud. 
 
Fraud specialists would generally not be driven 
by a fixed budget. They would examine their 
work and review certain findings at the end of 
each phase. This will give them the 
opportunity to assess whether additional work 
is required. Fraud specialists may request more 
time and resources for their investigation until 
they are satisfied with their assessment of 
whether fraud exists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting  
Vol. 5, Issue 1, January - June, 2013 
222 
 
Auditors’ thought processes 
Auditors think about accounting records in terms of the 
availability of supporting documents and the 
authenticity of the audit trail. They have to decide 
whether there is valid documentation to support the 
recorded transactions and whether they are presented in 
conformance with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). 
 
Auditors are required to maintain an appropriate level 
of professional skepticism by having a questioning 
mind when they are evaluating audit evidence. They are 
encouraged to consider risk factors relating to 
fraudulent financial reporting that include motive, 
opportunity, and rationalization.  
 
Auditors are encouraged to keep in mind that the 
possibility that a material misstatement due to 
unintentional error or fraud could be present, regardless 
of their belief about their client’s honesty and integrity. 
Fraud specialists’ thought processes 
Fraud specialists think about accounting 
records in terms of the authenticity of the 
events and activities that are behind the 
reported transactions. They have to evaluate 
whether these transactions actually took place 
and are consistent with other information in 
their investigation. 
 
Fraud specialists are expected to be sensitive 
to, and on the lookout for, the warning signs of 
fraud.  To discover fraud, it is important for 
fraud specialists to be able to think like a thief 
by asking themselves how they would probe 
and exploit any weaknesses of a company. 
 
Fraud specialists are mindful that a visible 
immaterial misstatement may appear to be 
inconsequential, but the hidden portion of the 
misstatement could be substantial. 
 
Overall, our experts agreed there is a substantial difference between financial statement 
auditors and forensic specialists in terms of their responsibilities and task objectives. Financial 
statement auditors are expected to examine their clients’ accounts either individually or in 
aggregate with other accounts. They are expected to focus on accounts with a reasonable 
possibility of containing a material misstatement. Auditors primarily work with a materiality 
level that serves as a guide to their evaluations of audit evidence. The implication of materiality 
is considered so that auditors do not become overly concerned with minor discrepancies in any 
single account, unless these discrepancies are indicative of larger or pervasive problems. Given 
that they have a predetermined time budget for their work, auditors understand that if they spend 
too much time examining one area, they may have to spend less time somewhere else or run the 
risk of going over budget. While time is of the essence in an audit, auditors understand it is vital 
to do a sufficient amount of work and should not intentionally reduce or eliminate a procedure. 
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In addition, auditors are not expected to examine every transaction and would generally rely on 
audit sampling. 
 On the other hand, our experts indicated forensic specialists are typically called in to 
examine whether fraud exists in either a single account or a single transaction. They may also be 
asked to look at a series of transactions since fraud may not necessarily occur in a single 
transaction. Unlike auditors, forensic specialists do not deal with a materiality level. Materiality 
is irrelevant to forensic specialists because fraud often occurs below the materiality level. 
Similarly, forensic specialists would assess all discrepancies (whether major or minor) to 
understand their nature and to determine if they are indicative of fraud. They are expected to 
examine everything in great depth and would generally not rely on audit sampling. In addition, 
forensic specialists are typically not driven by a fixed time budget. They examine their work and 
review certain findings at the end of each phase to assess whether additional work is required. 
They may request more time and resources for their investigation until they are satisfied with 
their assessment of whether fraud exists. 
Our experts acknowledged auditors’ concerns with materiality and time budgets often 
hinder their abilities to detect fraud. In general, all of the experts confirmed to us that there is a 
vast difference between financial statement auditors and forensic specialists in regard to their 
training as well as their effectiveness in fraud detection. The experts agreed that without proper 
and adequate forensic training, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for auditors to uncover 
fraud in a financial statement audit. This perhaps helps to explain why the ACFE has found a 
deteriorating trend in external auditors’ abilities in detecting fraud despite the emphasis and 
focus on fraud detection. The ACFE found the majority of fraud cases were detected by tips 
rather than through external audit (ACFE, 2012; ACFE, 2010; ACFE, 2008; ACFE, 2006; 
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ACFE, 2004; ACFE, 2002). Figure 1 depicts the percentage of fraud cases uncovered by external 
audit as compared to tips from 2002 through 2012. 
 
Fig. 1 Percentage of Fraud Cases Uncovered by External Audit and by Tips 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our review of the changes in auditors’ responsibility for fraud detection has shown 
standard setters have a tendency to issue additional auditing standards as a response to widely 
publicized fraud cases. On the same note, auditors have been reluctant to take on additional 
responsibility for detecting and providing assurance regarding the presence of fraud. In fact, as 
additional fraud-related audit standards are issued, auditors tend to minimize their impacts and 
fail to incorporate the provisions of the standards (PCAOB, 2007). Nevertheless, standard setters 
and the audit profession have demonstrated a consistent commitment to improving auditors’ 
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fraud detection performances. Unfortunately, no audit standard can provide absolute assurance 
that auditors can detect all fraud (Wells, 2004a). Moreover, despite the efforts put forth by the 
profession, auditors are generally poor at detecting fraud.   
Currently, SAS No. 99 is the law of the land in regards to how auditors should perform 
procedures to detect fraud within the financial statements. Empirical evidence indicates the 
percentage of fraud cases uncovered by external auditors has diminished in recent years (ACFE, 
2012; ACFE, 2010; ACFE, 2008; ACFE, 2006; ACFE, 2004; ACFE, 2002). We contend the 
failure in fraud detection is not a reflection of auditors’ lack of commitment in carrying out their 
audit task. Nor can the failure be attributed to inadequacy in the current fraud audit standards. 
Rather, we believe the failure of auditors is one of execution. 
SAS No. 99 takes a red flags approach to fraud detection. That is, auditors, within the 
current audit methodology, are expected to obtain a detailed understanding of their audit client. 
Through doing so, auditors are to identify risk factors, especially pertaining to fraud. Once a 
fraud risk factor is identified, auditors are expected to modify their audit programs to perform 
detailed audit procedures to search for the presence of fraud (AICPA, 2002). This approach for 
detecting fraud derived from the perpetration of numerous fraudulent cases despite the existence 
of warning signs for auditors to detect. The failure in this model is individuals with expertise in 
forensic accounting/fraud auditing are brought onto the engagement only upon the identification 
of fraud by financial statement auditors. Thus, there is a mismatch between auditors’ training and 
skills and what is required of them within SAS No. 99. Prior literature and our expert panel 
confirmed our belief that there is a vast difference between financial statement auditors and 
forensic specialists. In particular, auditors appear to exhibit a lack of sensitivity in discerning the 
telltale signs of fraud, or the red flags that are necessary to be identified within the current fraud 
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model. Moreover, typical audit firms provide little to no forensic training on how to uncover 
fraud in a financial statement audit. As a result, it is our conjecture that frauds will continue to go 
undetected by auditors unless there is a fundamental change to the current audit model.  
To improve auditors’ fraud detection abilities, we believe it is necessary to integrate 
forensic procedures and forensic specialists in all audit engagements. That is, for every audit 
engagement there should be at least one individual on the audit team who can be classified as a 
forensic specialist. Moreover, this individual needs to be present during the entire audit 
engagement, rather than either providing limited input or being called into the engagement once 
fraud is detected. We concede that this proposal could fail as a result of the additional cost 
burden related to such a requirement. Therefore, at the very minimum, we believe it is of 
paramount importance to train financial statement auditors in the areas of forensic accounting 
and fraud auditing. With such training, auditors’ propensities to correctly identify and investigate 
fraud-related red flags should increase, resulting in a greater probability that more fraud will be 
detected by external audits as well as more confidence in auditors’ abilities to protect the 
interests of stakeholders. 
  In order to better protect the public from fraud and to maintain the credibility of the 
audit profession, accounting researchers must continue to explore ways that can help improve 
auditors’ abilities to detect and to limit fraud. We urge accounting researchers to develop fraud-
research programs or studies by examining a series of questions posed by the PCAOB (see 
Appendix A for the categories of questions raised by the PCAOB). As stated previously, one of 
the questions raised by the PCAOB’s Standing Advisory Group was whether forensic specialists 
employ a different mindset than financial statements auditors. Comments from our panel of 
experts provided evidence to support the notion that forensic specialists do indeed have a 
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different mindset than financial statements auditors. Using an experiment, Chui et al. (2012) 
found individuals with a fraud specialist mindset made higher fraud risk assessments; were less 
likely to evaluate the company’s accounts as fairly presented; and were more likely to take 
further investigation action to examine the company’s accounts than those with the audit 
mindset. These results provide preliminary empirical evidence to suggest it is possible to 
increase auditors’ awareness of fraud by priming them with a fraud specialist mindset. Decision 
aids typically have positive effects on the quality of cognitive processing (Bonner, 2007). Thus, 
we believe it would be beneficial for accounting researchers to explore possible decision aids 
that would help auditors to adapt to the fraud specialist mindset and to increase the likelihood of 
auditors identifying red flags and uncovering fraud during an audit. 
Fraud is costly and it is often a moving target. Auditors are not fraud specialists and there 
are fundamental differences between financial statements audit and fraud examination. 
Nevertheless, the prevalence of fraud requires that auditors be vigilant when considering the 
possibility of fraud during the financial statements audit. It is important for us as a profession to 
continue the pursuit of finding ways to incorporate forensic training and procedures into an audit 
as a means to improve auditors’ fraud detection performances.  
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APPENDIX A 
Categories of Fraud-related Questions by the PCAOB Standing Advisory Group 
 
Categories  
 SAS No. 99  
 Risk and Fraud Risk Factors  
 Revenue Recognition related 
 Significant or Unusual Accruals  
 Related Parties  
 Estimates of Fair Value 
 Analytical Procedures 
 Quarterly Financial Information 
 Journal Entries  
 Discussions with the Audit Committee  
 Detection of Illegal Acts  
 Forensic Accountants in an Audit of Financial Statements  
 
 
